Cardenas’s work reflects on a series of international legal topics including legal theory, the theory of the sources, customary law, law of the sea, human rights, international criminal law, international investment law, international trade law, international humanitarian law, and international environmental law, among others.
His publications have developed environmental discussions in international legal studies from a Global South theoretical perspective. Cardenas is also an international legal consultant for public and private (national and international) organizations, a columnist for the national and international press, as well as an active member of different international law academic societies.Finally, the paper formulates a series of questions whose main aim is to make a call for rethinking the sources of international law. It is posited here that such sources should not remain static but rather develop at the speed of contemporary international relations.
Special reference is made to international environmental law being considered as a particular branch of international law.After considering international law as an argumentative practice socially constructed, Cardenas claims that CIL is the product of successful argumentative campaigns carried out by international lawyers who usually work for States but who could also represent the interests of other actors different from States. Thereby he posits that although State lawyers’ views tend to be prioritized when identifying CIL, considerations of lawyers working for NSAs could be also take into account.
He initially argues that the two-element approach to CIL reproduced by the International Law Commission is just one possible perspective out of many. He advocates a social perspective of CIL with a view to defending the position that the community of international lawyers could give significant weight to NSAs’ positions in the formation of CIL.Cardenas argues that when interpreting customary international law, it is not feasible to separate the intellectual process of interpretation from that of determining content and ascertaining the law of the source. Therefore, when a customary norm is being interpreted, its content is also being determined, while it is still conceivable to consider particular law ascertainment criteria.
All of this is possible when interpretation concerns a malleable and still mysterious source like CIL. The foregoing processes, forerun by the act of interpretation, are intellectual in nature, argumentatively construed by the community of international lawyers. This means that the very existence of objective rules of interpretation for CIL is a matter to be disputed.